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Abstract
This article sets out findings from a project focused on #stopIslam, a hashtag that 
gained prominence following the Brussels terror attack of 2016. We initially outline 
a big data analysis which shows how counter-narratives – criticizing #stopIslam – 
momentarily subverted negative news reporting of Muslims. The rest of the article 
details qualitative findings that complicate this initial positive picture. We set out key 
tactics engaged in by right-wing actors, self-identified Muslim users, would-be allies and 
celebrities and elucidate how these tactics were instrumental in the direction, dynamics 
and legacies of the hashtag. We argue that the tactical interventions of tightly bound 
networks of right-wing actors, as well as the structural constraints of the platform, 
not only undermined the longevity and coherence of the counter-narratives but subtly 
modulated the affordances of Twitter in ways that enabled these users to extend their 
voice outwards, reinforcing long-standing representational inequalities in the process.
Keywords
Counter-narratives, hate speech, Islamophobia, right-wing populism, social media, 
Twitter
Introduction
In the wake of the well-documented rise of populist right-wing politics in Europe and 
North America (Emcke, 2019; Kellner, 2016), there has been widespread concern about 
social media being used in ways that normalizes xenophobia (Evolvi, 2018; Feshami, 
2018; Siapera, 2019) and propagates disinformation about minority groups (Farkas et al., 
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2017; Horsti, 2017). Glimmers of hope, however, have also been argued to exist, with the 
same media that have enabled the rapid spread of hate speech also appearing to offer 
opportunities to contest it. Platforms such as Twitter, for instance, have been seen to 
enable the formation of anti-racist and anti-Islamophobic counter-narratives that gain 
circulation in the wider public sphere (Dawes, 2017; Jackson and Foucault Welles, 
2015). To draw on Sarah Jackson and Brooke Foucault Welles’s (2015) definition, these 
online counter-narratives consist of ‘outward-looking attempt to challenge mainstream 
narratives’ (p. 4), which ‘reframe and retell’ (p. 5) existing depictions of an issue. In the 
process, counter-narratives can enable perspectives that are often excluded from the 
mainstream media (i.e. television and national newspapers) to be ‘articulated en mass’ 
(Jackson and Foucault Welles, 2015: 4).
In this article, we conceptualize the significance of tactics that were engaged in by 
different actors involved in circulating #stopIslam: a hashtag that initially trended on 
Twitter following the Brussels terror attacks of 2016. The hashtag seemed to reflect both 
long-standing anti-Islamic discourses in mainstream Western European media (Baker 
et al., 2013; Poole, 2002) and the contemporary intensification and internationalization 
of these discourses, typified by campaigning surrounding Brexit and the US presidential 
election, which saw an ‘insiders’/‘outsiders’ discourse become a central component of 
mainstream political campaigning across Europe and North America (Martin, 2016; 
Modood, 2017). However, what was notable about #stopIslam is that the reason it trended 
on Twitter was not due to people using it to spread hate speech. Instead #stopIslam grew 
to prominence because those critical of Islamophobia were engaging with it in order to 
condemn its original sentiment. As such, the dynamics of the hashtag offer insight into 
the processes through which particular social media platforms can serve both as vectors 
for the spread of hate speech and create scope to contest it.
The article evaluates the efficacy of tactical attempts to contest #stopIslam, with a 
particular focus on the limitations of these tactics in light of well-organized opposition 
on the part of actors seeking to perpetuate its original anti-Islamic sentiment. These find-
ings are primarily based on qualitative data about who was engaging with #stopIslam, 
how the hashtag was being deployed and the dialogue that surrounded its deployment. 
Although our focus here is on qualitative research, the data we are drawing on is derived 
from a larger mixed-methods project about key potentials and challenges facing online 
counter-narratives against racialized Islamophobic hate speech (see Poole et al., 2019). 
This big data study gathered and analysed all tweets using #stopIslam for 40 days follow-
ing the Brussels terrorist attack (22 March 2016), using computational methods. The 
findings were further interrogated through a manual quantitative analysis of the 5000 
most shared tweets and finally a qualitative analysis of the top 150 retweets and their 
associated comments. It is these qualitative materials that we focus on here.
After setting the scene by providing a brief summary of our quantitative data and the 
methodology used to analyse the qualitative materials that are the focus of this article, the 
main body of the article delineates dominant tactics that were used, first, by self-identified 
right-wing Twitter users (to propagate the hashtag), before turning to would-be allies and 
self-defined Muslim users (who attempted to contest it). In addition to evaluating the sig-
nificance of these tactics in shaping the overarching discourse associated with #stopIslam, 
we also elaborate on their theoretical significance and elucidate how particular tactics 
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productively complicate the distinction between tactics and strategies (as made by De 
Certeau, 1984) that is often used to understand public engagement with social media (e.g. 
De Ridder, 2013; Liao and Humphreys, 2014; Manovich, 2009). We suggest the approaches 
used by key actors instead serve as ‘tactical interventions’ (see, Giraud, 2018, 2019), 
wherein users attempt ‘to interfere in complex communication ecologies by modulating the 
affordances of particular media, a sort of digital weapon of the weak intended to counteract 
the growing power differentials in this realm’ (Lezaun, 2018: 224). What events surround-
ing #stopIslam elucidate, however, is that – in the context of commercial social media – 
though particular tactics might subtly modulate the affordances of social media, these shifts 
often work to intensify rather than unsettle existing representational inequalities.
Literature review
Recent research exploring how social media lends itself to reactionary politics (e.g. 
Schradie, 2019) resonates with a longer tradition of theoretical critique, wherein com-
mercial media platforms have been conceptualized as undermining liberal–democratic 
politics by fostering a: ‘political-medialogical setting [. . .] of dissensus, incredulity and 
competing conceptions of reality’ (Dean, 2009: 147). At the same time, it is striking that 
– as recently as 2016 – researchers were pointing to a lack of empirical research about 
the role of digital media in right-wing movements, in comparison with the large body of 
work about progressivist groups (Mercea et al., 2016: 285). Although this gap in knowl-
edge is being rapidly redressed (e.g. Ouellette and Banet-Weiser, 2018; Schradie, 2019), 
this is an ongoing project and further work needs to be undertaken to develop theoreti-
cally informed empirical work, which conceptualizes the dynamics of communication 
ecologies that allow hate speech to circulate and become normalized.
Digital media technologies, for instance, have often been connected with right-wing 
populism in generalized ways. Popular commentaries on the spread of mis- and disinfor-
mation have argued that the Internet has ‘been the all-important, primary, indispensable 
engine of Post-Truth’ (D’Ancona, 2017: 49). The affordances of platforms such as Twitter 
have been argued to create ‘ideological silos’ and ‘powerful echo chambers of misinfor-
mation’ that have displaced mainstream news media and lent support to narratives propa-
gated by the populist right (Ott, 2017: 65). Although often containing valuable insight, 
such commentaries nonetheless tend to construct overly deterministic narratives about the 
role of particular technologies, enacting what Emiliano Treré (2019) describes as the ‘one-
medium fallacy’ (p. 9) that neglects the way the affordances of any given platform are 
shaped by their position within a broader communications ecology (composed of interac-
tions between different media platforms and communicative practices).
Cognizant of the danger of privileging a particular platform in isolation, without situ-
ating it in its constitutive communications ecology, it is because of Twitter’s relationship 
with a range of other media platforms and communicative practices that the dynamics of 
hashtags such as #stopIslam are significant. Due to broader declines in resources for 
investigative journalism within the mainstream media (Fenton, 2010), Twitter has been 
increasingly treated as a news source in its own right (Broersma and Graham, 2013). The 
relationship between the platform and the mainstream media has given Twitter particular 
significance in relation to anti-racist politics.
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Existing research into the relationship between Twitter and the media has pointed to 
the way hashtag campaigns have created visibility for anti-racist narratives (Rambukanna, 
2015). Although the temporary, ‘ad hoc’ (Bruns and Burgess, 2011; Dawes, 2017) pub-
lics who mobilize around particular hashtags are often transitory in themselves, they can 
have a lasting impact on mainstream media discourse. As Jackson and Foucault Welles 
(2015, 2016) elucidate: in the context of campaigns such as #BlackLivesMatter and 
#Ferguson, hashtags were not only used in ways that gave online visibility to perspectives 
that were formerly marginalized within the media, but gave platforms to community 
spokespeople and offered frames that went on to inform mainstream news.
Yet, although Twitter has been used to anti-racist ends, it has equally been accused 
of propagating everyday racism that ranges from the circulation of gifs and memes that 
perpetuate stereotypes (Sharma, 2013) to more strategic uses of humour to disguise 
racism and misogyny that has been a hallmark of the right-wing populism (Ringrose, 
2018). These latter developments are entangled with more organized forms of racism, 
associated with what Wahl-Jorgensen (2019) describes as ‘angry populism’, an ‘emo-
tional regime’ that creates ‘exclusionary solidarities’ by portraying minority groups as 
shared enemies (p. 110). While Twitter itself is argued to provide a space for ‘collective 
affect’ (Abdel-Fadil, 2019) where exclusionary solidarities are reinscribed, this consoli-
dation of identity often occurs through the relationship between Twitter and other media. 
A growing body of research indicates the platform’s role in disseminating discrimina-
tory rhetoric that originated in the echo chambers of right-wing web fora (Siapera, 
2019), with groups tactically using ‘trigger events’ (Awan, 2014; Copsey et al., 2013) 
such as the Brussels attacks – and the hashtags associated with these events – to gain 
wider visibility for their views. These dynamics mean that despite features such as 
hashtags bringing those with different ideological commitments together, interactions 
on Twitter have not been found to serve a Habermasian public sphere ideal of debate but 
result in antagonistic encounters (Evolvi, 2018) that serve to entrench reactionary views 
(Karlsen et al., 2017).
Methods and sample
Building on these debates, in order to analyse the framing and dynamics of #stopIs-
lam, we adopted a multi-method approach incorporating computational analysis with 
manual quantitative and qualitative content analysis (Cresswell and Clark, 2007). The 
first approach, often known as the study of ‘big data’, has been adopted for many 
critical data studies that examine the representation and use by marginal groups to 
highlight issues around identity politics (including Black identity politics in the 
United States, Jackson and Foucault Welles, 2015, 2016; work on refugee-related 
hashtags, Siapera et al., 2018; and the #metoo movement, Clark-Parsons, 2019; 
Mendes et al., 2018). These methods are extremely beneficial for analysing big data 
sets; they can reveal the longitudinal patterns in the development of networks and the 
framing of a particular issue, allowing for the categorization of data and thus reduce 
time manually coding. However, they have their limitations, with the main criticisms 
relating to the assumed accuracy, transparency and objectivity in the way the results 
are gathered and presented (boyd and Crawford, 2012). Similar criticisms have been 
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levelled at quantitative content analysis, so triangulation is the best approach to 
address the limitations in any methods used, with a critical eye on research design and 
reflexivity when analysing and presenting the results.
We used Twitter’s enterprise API (Application Programme Interface) platform Gnip1 
to ensure the full data set was collected, including all tweets using the hashtag #stopIs-
lam from just before the attacks (on 22 March 2016) and for 40 days following it (20 
March–29 April 2016).2 After removing the spam from the 551,400 tweets we received 
from Twitter, we were left with 66,764 unique tweets and 235,578 retweets (shared origi-
nal tweets), 302,342 in total. As well as applying content and descriptive analytics, we 
also undertook a network analysis of those users who had retweeted others and been 
retweeted. This was followed by a manual quantitative analysis of the 5000 most shared 
tweets. After sorting for deleted accounts, this left us with 4263 tweets. We used a coding 
schedule to measure the date and time of tweets, location, gender, religion and political 
and/or institutional affiliation of the tweeter, topic of the tweet and to establish whether 
they were part of the dominant narrative (against Muslims) or counter-narrative (that 
contested the original negative narrative). This enabled us to verify the results of the 
computational analysis; we were particularly careful about not making assumptions 
about identity (religion, for example) and location and coded these as unknown, unless 
they were specifically identified by the account users (using the biographies of account 
holders to verify these details). For a longer discussion of methods, particularly relating 
to the quantitative stages, please refer to Poole et al. (2019).
Qualitative content analysis allows for a richer analysis of the structure, language, 
imagery and interactions of participants, an approach that (in line with Deacon et al., 
2007) can be valuable in establishing the construction of activist narratives and identity. 
We analysed the 150 most shared tweets with three coders analysing 20 each (two of 
these being the authors who had a strong insight into the data from previous stages of 
the project). To ensure inter-coder reliability, there were three meetings at key moments 
throughout the analysis, before, during and after the process. At each meeting, a sample 
of tweets (10) was co-analysed to resolve any discrepancies and ensure a consistency of 
interpretation. Written guidelines were also issued prior to these meetings and refined if 
required in subsequent discussions. Two of the authors then analysed the findings across 
the data set, rather than focusing on their own 50 tweets, which provided another level 
of verification.
The comments we examined were highly polarized; posts tended to either directly 
challenge rhetoric in the tweets they were responding to or overtly praise it, which made 
them relatively straight forward to categorize consistently between coders. A popular 
counter-narrative tweet in our sample, for instance, was a meme depicting the Ku Klux 
Klan (KKK), which pointed to the hypocrisy of people focusing on Islamic terrorism 
and neglecting White supremacism. We labelled messages that disputed the factual con-
tent of the tweet as ‘disagreeing’ (e.g. tweets that argue the KKK ‘hasn’t done anything 
recently’, ‘don’t have a state’, ‘are less of a global threat’, or posted links to articles 
about Islamic extremism as a counter-point). In contrast, we categorized comments as 
‘agreeing’ if they praised the content of the tweet (e.g. by stating it showed the hashtag 
was trending for the ‘right reasons’ or linked to articles about right-wing extremism that 
backed up its sentiment). More nuanced messages, which did not adopt an overt, 
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polarized, stance, were sparse. A small number of exceptions to this rule came from 
Muslims themselves, who made critical comments about terrorism (using terminology 
such as ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalization’) but situated these comments as part of a 
broader defence of ‘ordinary Muslims’ and condemned the overall sentiment of #stopIs-
lam, which led to us categorizing such comments as ‘disagreeing’ with tweets propagat-
ing the original narrative and ‘agreeing’ with counter-narrative sentiment (see section 
‘tactics engaged in by Muslim users’, p. 18).
Tweets that were more difficult to categorize, such as potentially sarcastic messages, 
were also discussed in coding meetings. Sarcasm can be difficult to detect online – 
indeed it is often exploited to deny that particular statements are hate speech (Frenda, 
2018) – so, for the purpose of our sample, we defined sarcasm as tweets that seemed to 
infer one thing but used explicit signifiers to show they meant the opposite. For instance, 
one of the most widely circulated tweets in our sample appeared to be a positive state-
ment about Islam being a peaceful religion, but this was directly undermined by a meme 
underneath the tweet that associated Islam with violence. Due to tweets like this having 
clear signifiers of their political stance, we found that they had been categorized con-
sistently between coders. The prominence of such tweets, moreover, elucidates the 
value of the qualitative approach used for this study, as it provided the necessary con-
textual detail to interpret the meaning of tweets in ways that could not be captured by 
quantitative data.
In order to adhere with recent ethical guidance on the handling of social media data 
(e.g. Townsend and Wallace, 2016), we only include data that have been processed in 
ways that do not identify individual users, mostly by describing the content of tweets or 
citing fragments that have generic wording (instead of quoting verbatim) and reproduc-
ing memes that were shared by multiple users.
Overall, using this triangulated approach ensured that we could capture a comprehen-
sive and robust picture of the dynamics within this hashtag; in this article, focusing on 
the tactics of participants in their interactions with each other, which resulted in the fram-
ing of the hashtag in a particular way.
The dynamics of a racist hashtag: quantitative data
The big data analysis suggested the negativity of the hashtag with a higher proportion of 
keywords having a negative slant such as ‘stop’, ‘ignorant’, ‘terrorism’, ‘hate’ or ‘stupid’ 
(see Poole et al., 2019 for a more extended discussion of the quantitative findings). A 
search of top related hashtags consolidated this finding and revealed the politics of those 
circulating the hashtag, linking its ongoing circulation to US conservative groups on 
Twitter (#tcot) and right-wing political discourse (#wakeupamerica) in the build up to 
the election of Donald Trump (#Trump2016). User bios and location data confirmed that 
many of those circulating the hashtag were US based. The dominance of users from the 
United States reflects a media landscape where political events on social media are 
increasingly being used opportunistically by political groups. In this instance, though the 
event was in Europe, it was being utilized by right-wing individuals and communities in 
the United States to leverage support for Donald Trump’s 2016 electoral campaign. 
According to Modood (2017), Islamophobia has been central to the rhetoric of Trumpism 
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as a ‘nationalist-populist’ movement which requires the identification of ‘insiders and 
outsiders’ to garner support (for more discussion of the connection between this hashtag, 
post-truth, and right-wing populism and for further elucidation of these dynamics, see 
Poole et al., 2019). Furthermore, a network analysis of users retweeting each other 
revealed the close ties of the right with particular accounts serving as nodes who anchored 
these networks.
When we examined the most shared tweets, however, these were predominantly 
counter-narratives supporting Muslims, including nine out of the top 10 retweets. It was 
then evident that many of the negative words being used in the tweets were attacking the 
hashtag rather than Muslims as in ‘why is this hateful hashtag trending?’ However, 
despite the largest proportion of tweets in our sample supporting the counter-narrative, 
this was relatively short-lived. Examining the timeline of the hashtag showed that coun-
ter-narratives were more likely to be posted within 24 hours of the event, while those 
attacking Muslims were more persistent over time (Figure 1). The longevity of the anti-
Muslim discourse was also evident in subsequent occurrences of the hashtag. After the 
Manchester and London terrorist attacks, 2017, it had reverted back to being wholly 
negative and anti-Muslim. Also of significance was the number of media outlets report-
ing on the hashtag trending that overwhelmingly focused on the counter-narrative (dis-
cussed in more depth below). In this way, counter-narratives about Muslims were 
momentarily able to subvert dominant (negative) news about Muslims (a framing that is 
becoming more common in light of the growing prominence of right-wing extremism). 
These patterns will now be further explored through a discussion of the findings of the 
qualitative analysis of the most shared tweets.
Figure 1. Timeline of Tweets.
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Overview of tactical engagements with #stopIslam
Of the 150 most shared tweets, most constructed a counter-narrative against #stopIslam 
(Figure 2), 29 of these 91 tweets were posted by accounts identifying as Muslim (19%). 
Yet, when we examine the comments, it is clear that responses to these tweets were pre-
dominantly in line with the sentiment of the original hashtag (Figure 3). This dynamic 
– of the majority of tweets contesting anti-Islamic sentiment, while the majority of com-
ments propagated it – was the most common pattern of how the hashtag initially played 
out. The ‘trench warfare’ dynamic described by Karlsen et al. (2017) was reflected in the 
minimal interactions that arose between participants in the comments, with almost no 
interaction between the original tweeters and the respondents to their tweets.
The most shared tweets (perhaps inevitably) tended to be those that had the most fol-
lowers: opinion leaders, activists, celebrities (who we defined as those whose fame 
derived from a context other than their social media use) and influencers (whose fame 
originated due to their social media prominence). Interestingly, in the time from when we 
initially collected the data to writing up our analysis, Twitter had removed a large propor-
tion of ‘offensive’ content, so, for example, where initially the most shared celebrity 
tweet was retweeted 3904 times, had 6254 likes and 362 comments, at the time of writ-
ing, it had 3676 retweets, 5883 likes and 337 comments. This was common across the 
tweets and demonstrates Twitter’s role as an ‘active agent’ (Kriess and McGregor, 2017) 
in the direction and legacy of the narrative. Not surprisingly, the number of comments 
correlated with the number of times tweets were shared (Figure 4).
Also of note was that the 150 most shared tweets were generated by only 110 users; 
this meant that although the majority of tweets derived from unique accounts, a small 
number were from individuals posting multiple times, with 14 users appearing more than 
twice. One user’s tweets, however, appeared 21 times in the sample, suggesting that even 
though the overall proportion of users whose tweets appeared multiple times was small, 
these users could play a significant role in propagating particular narratives (indeed, as 
discussed in more depth below, this particular user was significant in anchoring key 
right-wing user networks that surrounded the hashtag).
Dominant Counter-narrative Mixed Missing Total
41 (27%) 91 (61%) 3 (2%) 15 (10%) 150 (100%)
Figure 2. Position taken in the 150 most shared tweets.
Dominant Counter-narrative Mixed Missing/Unknown Total
97 (65%) 18 (12%) 13 (9%) 22 (15%) 150 (100%)
Figure 3. Position taken in the comments to the most shared tweets.
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Discursive frames
Figure 5 shows the dominant themes of coverage we identified through our quantitative 
content analysis of 4263 tweets. While the most prominent single topic of tweets appears 
to be those that negate the relationship between Islam and terrorism, when topics are 
combined, there is a fairly even split between positive (46.4%) and negative (44.1%) 
discourses about Islam. At the time, we speculated that this could be because there was 
less diversity in the counter-narratives being shared. However, the qualitative data dem-
onstrated that there was a greater range in the content of counter-narrative tweets and 
comments than among the dominant narratives.
Dominant narratives tended to focus quite singularly on equating Islam with terrorism 
and ‘evil’, using decontextualized extracts from the Quran to support these arguments, 
and linking the hashtag with anti-Democrat agendas. Other topics paralleled that of 
mainstream media discourse (in an exaggerated form) relating refugees and immigrants 
to radicalization, and constructing narratives of Islamification and thus providing a 
coherent and predominantly negative story about Islam (cf. Siapera et al., 2015).
Tweets No of Retweets No of comments
1-50 1000-2000 Up to 400
51-100 400-600 40-100
101-150 200-300 10-40
Figure 4. Average number of retweets and comments: most shared tweets.
Topic Number %
Negates the relationship between Islam and Terrorism 1,419 33.3
Islamification/spread of Islam 967 22.7
Islam as a negative force 704 16.5
Islam as a positive force 397 9.3
Anti-left agendas 209 4.9
Muslims as victims/discrimination/Islamophobia 141 3.3
Reflecting on the # trending 127 3.0
Anti-far right discourse 22 0.5
Other 55 1.3
Total 4,041 94.8
Other identified themes 222 5.2
Total Sample 4,263 100
Figure 5. Themes of tweets and retweets.
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Echoing other work that has foregrounded how frames established by negative nar-
ratives constrain attempts at contestation (Siapera et al., 2018), sentiments contained in 
the original hashtag also structured the counter-narrative content. For example, as 
depicted in Figure 5, many of the tweets reacted defensively towards the original narra-
tive’s attack on Islam and Muslims, and were critical of the hashtag as ignorant or 
Islamophobic, an approach that was easily undermined by apparently ‘factual’ informa-
tion offered by right-wing users (such as statistics, links to news stories and memes 
mocking positive sentiment). In the following sections, we discuss the tactics demon-
strated within the most common categories of tweet including anti-Islam tweets, 
counter- narrative tweets, tweets by Muslim participants and tweets shared by celebrities 
and media organizations.
Tactics of the right: appropriation, affirmation and humour
The populist political right, as represented in our sample, are a diversity of participants 
ranging from self-identifying conservatives (many also as Christians) to nationalists and 
White supremacists, some identifying as the ‘new’ or ‘alt-right’. Combinations of patri-
otic and Christian symbols were used to signify these intersecting identities, suggesting 
that religious iconography was being used less to signify spiritual identity and instead to 
denote political affiliation (Modood, 2017). While the participants did not tend to belong 
to organized groups, and predominantly engaged with the hashtag as individuals, their 
activities on Twitter – such as liking and retweeting – created a tightly bound network of 
like-minded individuals. These connections were made especially visible on conducting 
a network analysis that depicted which users retweeted one another most frequently. As 
illustrated by Figure 6, those circulating tweets that conformed to the narrative’s original, 
anti-Islamic sentiment (clustered here on the left-hand side of the image, oriented around 
some particularly prominent accounts signalled by the large nodes) consisted of users 
who retweeted one another multiple times. In contrast, users engaged with the counter-
narrative formed a much more dispersed network.
These close-knit connections between right-wing users enabled the rapid spread of 
memes that parodied the counter-narrative and enabled these actors to work together to 
close down counter-narrative intervention, by tagging more high profile users, for exam-
ple. It was these ‘opinion leaders’ or ‘influencers’, journalists or vloggers of right-wing 
content that had the most shared tweets. The most prolific of these was the account of a 
prominent right-wing blogger, who described herself as ‘anti-Islam’. She tweeted #sto-
pIslam 93 times in total, was responsible for 21 of the most shared tweets (as described 
above), and was often strategically tagged into tweets by other users, a tactic that was 
used repeatedly as means of introducing the hashtag to a global audience. Many of the 
high-profile participants (such as this account), for instance, only began tweeting later in 
the day or day after the attacks, after being tagged by other users, yet their posts still had 
some of the highest numbers of shares. These dynamics reflect how the affordances of 
platforms such as Twitter reinforce the dominance of ‘elites’ and hence the power struc-
tures present in traditional media. The influence of these highly visible users is illustrated 
by the only negative tweet appearing in the top 10 most shared tweets (ninth position) 
being circulated by a ‘new right’ vlogger with 974,000 followers. The tweet initially 
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suggests that #stopIslam is Islamophobic and Islam is a religion of peace but the meme 
demonstrates its sarcasm, providing a graph claiming to be from Wikipedia (though the 
image does not currently appear on the site) that positions Islamism as the most prolific 
architect of terrorism (Figure 7).
The simple tactic of affirmation through volume was a characteristic response to 
tweets such as this; of the 116 comments, for instance, 63 agreed and 19 disagreed with 
the content of the tweet. Those agreeing also used sarcasm and humour to make their 
point (‘that religion of peace just killed . . . ’) and shared memes including multiple 
decontextualized quotes from the Quran to illustrate their point. While the counter-
narratives tried to offer corrections to the information presented in the chart, disputing 
the categorizations, definitions and providing opposing quotes from the Quran, as dis-
cussed in more depth below, the volume and persistence of the right-wing tweeters 
proved hard to contest.
This emotional investment by anti-Islam participants is further demonstrated by the 
response to counter-narrative tweets or comments by those defending Islam, which we 
have termed ‘flak’ (following Herman and Chomsky, 1988). As well as the high volume 
of comments agreeing with Islamophobic tweets, and deployment of memes and statis-
tics, participants used the tactic of repeating statements and engaging in trolling across 
different users’ accounts. For example, there were frequent instances of the same people 
commenting on multiple tweets, with statements such as ‘Muslims are terrorists: fact’. In 
one example, a self-identified Muslim posted a quote from the Quran which suggested 
that those circulating the hashtag should educate themselves (Figure 8), which they fol-
lowed, in the comments, by, and unusually, a more lengthy engagement to defend Islam. 
In a prolonged discussion, where the Muslim user attempted to challenge the source of 
the anti-Islam actor’s knowledge, the latter was rescued by allies posting memes of page 
Figure 6. Retweet network.
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Figure 7. Meme shared in the most retweeted ‘dominant narrative’ tweet.
Figure 8. Meme shared by Muslim user: Counter-narrative.
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references to the Quran that appeared to corroborate their claims (Figure 9). Here the 
volume of responses worked to make any further counter-narrative intervention appear 
futile, silencing the critic and increasing the legitimacy of these views.
Additional tactics of the right, in response to counter-narrative tweets,include disput-
ing, dismissing and refuting the claims, and defending their own actions. For example, a 
counter-narrative tweet, accompanied by the meme shown in Figure 10, refutes any link 
between Islam and terrorism and questions the relative value of White and ‘Muslim/
Arab’ people. Responses to this counter-narrative included disputing using ‘alternative 
facts’ (Quranic quotes, statistics, memes and links to articles); dismissing the importance 
of Muslim lives (‘I don’t care if you kill each other’); refuting the claim (e.g. ‘we did 
pray for them’); and defending their actions (‘It’s not irrational to care more about attacks 
on home than other attacks’). Further examples of attempts to dispute the claim in Figure 
10 included arguing Belgium is multicultural and no longer identifies as a ‘White coun-
try’, offering ‘facts’ about European aid provided to Syria, and circulating memes such 
as the one shown in Figure 7. Also evident were White supremacist conspiracy theories, 
Figure 9. Meme used to challenge the counter-narrative in Figure 8.
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which accused ‘liberals’, Muslims and the mainstream media of themselves propagating 
fake news and deleting right-wing content that revealed the ‘truth’. Some of these tactics 
were evident in comments beneath counter-narrative tweets that accuse ‘the West’ of 
hypocrisy in their response to terrorism.
The use of appropriation whereby a separate event, reported elsewhere, is used to 
provide additional evidence to support the hegemonic discourse was also evident. In this 
case (Figure 11), the source (The Daily Mail) provided additional authority, an authority 
further legitimized by the fact it has been left in place by Twitter even though a signifi-
cant proportion of other openly anti-Islamic content has now been deleted. In this tweet, 
the author selects and highlights key factual evidence from the Daily Mail article, how 
many times the victim was stabbed, which is accompanied by the tagline ‘Murdered by 
the cult of peace’ and linked to several hashtags including #Trump and #NoRapefugees 
incorporating several right-wing themes (Islamophobia, anti-immigration).
This article was posted by a user self-identifying as a ‘pro-life Catholic’ and resulted 
in total agreement in the comments. Siapera (2019) has previously noted how semi-
organized right-wing groups link new events (often circulated by mainstream media) to 
pre-existing hashtags which are circulated through influential accounts, an example of 
‘transnational contagion’, and demonstrates the ‘instrumentalized’ use of Twitter for 
political purposes. Connecting these hashtags to particularly controversial events like 
terror attacks triggers the kind of affective response that is needed to give populist narra-
tives traction. It is clear how anger or outrage is ideologically and discursively con-
structed here to maintain hegemony.
Figure 10. Counter-narrative meme.
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This leads us to the final tactic of note which is the instrumental use of anti-Islam 
content as political propaganda to bolster Trump’s campaign for the White House. 
Quotes from Hillary Clinton supporting Muslims and conspiracy around Obama’s herit-
age are used to question their judgement – ‘they will bring in terrorists’; the fact that this 
support is espoused by the political enemy in turn further demonizes Muslims to right-
wing audiences.
Tactics from would-be allies: generalized criticism of hate speech
While uses of #stopIslam that received the highest number of retweets countered the 
hashtag’s original meaning, the way these messages attempted to combat Islamophobia 
generated tensions that undercut their aims. In this section, we detail a series of tensions 
that emerged and undermined tweets that tried to criticize the hashtag, beginning with a 
discussion of would-be allies who sought to defend Muslims.
One of the most common tactics used by those who sought to contest #stopIslam was 
making generalized criticisms of hate speech. Terrorism was repeatedly asserted to have 
‘no religion’, while Islam was defended on the basis of being a ‘religion of peace’, and 
people’s positive relationships with Muslim friends and colleagues were emphasized in 
order to debunk stereotypes (one of the most shared tweets described Muslim neigh-
bours regularly bringing food to a particular user when they were ill). Memes were 
frequently shared to underline these sentiments, ranging from aforementioned images 
of the KKK (which were used to frame Islamophobic rhetoric as hypocritical) to a clip 
Figure 11. Meme derived from a mainstream news source.
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of Ben Affleck defending Islam on HBO’s Real Time (often circulated with reference to 
Batman’s heroism).
The hashtag itself was also criticized for being Islamophobic, or propagating hate 
through ‘ignorance’ and ‘fearmongering’, with some users directly connecting the spread 
of #stopIslam with White supremacism. Others attempted to create a more nuanced pic-
ture of the reasons behind terror attacks seeking to reframe the problem using alternative 
hashtags (such as #stopISIS), and situating the events in a geopolitical context where it 
is not religion but the legacies of colonialism and ongoing racism that are framed as 
fostering alienation and violence.
As we detail in more depth below, due to the widespread circulation of these tweets 
(the most widely shared tweet – which questioned why people were focusing on Islam in 
light of rising violence associated with White supremacism – for instance was shared 
6643 times), they were valuable in affording the counter-narrative visibility within the 
mainstream media. At the same time, these tweets tended to rely on making generalized 
assertions, which meant they left openings for self-identified, right-wing Twitter users to 
undermine them with more specific counter-evidence. As described above, due to the 
‘evidence-based’ appearance of much of the commentary propagated by the right and the 
frequency with which it was posted (with some tweets receiving over 300 negative com-
ments), the counter-narrative sometimes, paradoxically, contributed to the circulation of 
hate speech rather than contesting it.
These dynamics were evident in the comments to a tweet that questioned why so 
much attention was focused on Islamic terrorism, in light of recent mass shootings in 
the United States by those affiliated with the Christian right. Of 37 comments, only two 
were supportive of this tweet, while the rest criticized the link between Christianity and 
violence; numerous comments offered statistics to debunk this connection and several 
inferred the poster themselves was racist in associating Christianity with Whiteness. 
One comment was especially notable, taking the form of a question that asked whether 
all of those trying to challenge the hashtag were working from ‘the same script repeated 
over and over again’.
Ironically, it was those propagating negative comments whose activities were more 
akin to a ‘script’. As illustrated by Siapera (2019), extreme right online communities 
routinely offer (highly prescriptive) guidance for propagating hate speech effectively on 
social media. As detailed within an infamous New Yorker piece on the style guide of neo-
Nazi site the Daily Stormer, for those posting on social media, users are instructed to 
include: ‘as much visual stimulation as possible’, to ‘appeal to the ADHD culture’, while 
passages from mainstream sources must be unaltered, so that ‘we can never be accused 
of “fake news” – or delisted by Facebook as such’ (in Marantz, 2018). Echoing academic 
research that has foregrounded the tactical role of humour and sarcasm (Frenda, 2018), 
such approaches are encouraged as the ‘unindoctrinated should not be able to tell if we 
are joking or not’ (in Marantz, 2018) in order to avoid censure while contributing to 
‘dehumaniz[ing]’ rhetoric. These guidelines resonate with our analysis of negative com-
ments that attacked the tweets of would-be allies, in which users drew on a fairly narrow 
and prescribed repertoire of action (oriented around the circulation of ‘humorous’ memes, 
statistics and hyperlinks).
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While it was not necessarily the case that all of the tweets we analysed followed a 
script in the purposive or prescriptive sense described above, the tightly bound nature of 
right-wing networks enabled the circulation of particular memes and phrasing nonethe-
less afforded these comments a sense of uniformity. A commonplace meme, for instance, 
took the form of a bingo card and displayed a series of boxes that detailed commonplace 
attempts to contest associations between Islam and terrorism – including ‘terrorists are 
not true Muslims’, ‘you took that verse out of context’ and ‘you are Islamophobic’ – that 
were juxtaposed with racialized stereotypes, in an attempt to mock common criticisms of 
Islamophobia while simultaneously propagating hate speech. The particular discourse 
employed in negative comments also contained recurring motifs that have come to be 
associated with the right (including ‘social justice warriors’ [SJWs], ‘snowflakes’ and 
references to ‘virtue signalling’), to dismiss critics.
Again the frequency with which users defending hate speech were attacked in com-
ments underneath their tweets also worked to shut down any sense of a counter-narrative. 
As with the above examples, of all of the tweets we examined, negative comments domi-
nated in every instance (with the exception of celebrity accounts, see below). Even those 
whose tweets had slightly lower levels of engagement expressed surprise and anxiety 
over criticism they received. A user who ordinarily posted about fashion and music for 
instance, repeated the common refrain that terrorism, rather than Islam, was the problem 
and received 328 retweets and 30 comments. After initially trying to refute an opening 
wave of comments containing Islamophobic rhetoric, this user stated they were no longer 
going to participate in discussion due to emotional exhaustion.
What is hinted at in this instance is the level of emotional labour involved in partici-
pating in narratives against hate, in a media environment that has enabled tightly bound 
groups of individuals both to rapidly respond to tweets and who have a ready repertoire 
of tactics and resources to draw on that require active work to contest. Questions need to 
be asked, however, about who is able to disengage in this way. Our findings point to the 
relative ease by which would-be allies can shield themselves, that is, by deleting tweets, 
dropping out or disengaging. In contrast, those identifying as Muslim or who had obvi-
ous racial identifiers on their profile would have to actively hide, obscure or deny an 
aspect of their identity in order to shield themselves from emotional labour in this way. 
Of course, our methodology could result in Muslims falling into the ‘allies’ category if 
they have not identified as such explicitly. Indeed, the act of not calling attention to this 
aspect of identity may be significant and, while the reasons for this cannot be assumed 
here, could be an important area of future research.
Social media advocacy campaigns have long been accused of inadvertently perpetu-
ating neo-colonial narratives and ethnocentric stereotypes in their attempts to speak for 
others (Holohan, 2019; Maxfield, 2015; Poole et al., 2019; Torchin, 2016). While the 
counter-narrative against #stopIslam might not have overtly perpetuated stereotypes, it 
was nonetheless in danger of reinscribing other inequalities. Tweets of would-be allies 
illustrate how counter-narratives themselves can be ‘hijacked’ in order to propagate the 
very hate speech these narratives were contesting. If these users then ‘drop out’ in ways 
that are not available to those most affected by Islamophobia, then their tweets could 
inadvertently contribute to the circulation of hate speech while being able to avoid its 
consequences.
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Figure 12. Meme used to assert a relationship between Islam and violence.
Tactics employed by Muslim Twitter users: contesting stereotypes
Although there are similarities in the tweets and tactics of Muslims and would-be allies, 
it is important to analyse these separately due to the specific attack on this aspect of 
identity. In this section, we discuss findings solely related to tweets where the user clearly 
identified as Muslim (in their bio) to avoid making assumptions based on other charac-
teristics. In general terms, (visible) Muslim voices were evident in this data set but not to 
the extent we might expect (15.8% of 4263 retweets). Only 11 of the 50 most shared 
tweets were posted by Muslims, just two in the top 10. Both of these were social activists 
from Pakistan. Most of these tweets received more flak than support and hence there was 
little engagement from Muslims in the comments.
The most prevalent tactic of Muslim users was to defend themselves with comments 
such as ‘I’m a Muslim and I’m not a terrorist’ or to criticize the ignorance of those 
tweeting #stopIslam. For example, the 10th most shared Tweet used a Muslim scholar’s 
quote, ‘If you didn’t study Islam, Please don’t say anything about Islam’ to support their 
statement ‘Islam doesn’t teach terrorism’ and negate this relationship. This intervention 
was met by a barrage of memes, illustrated by Figure 12, and accompanied by sarcastic 
comments such as ‘sure, except for this!’.
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The Tweet was shared 1818 times and received 55 negative comments and 11 com-
ments in support of the counter-narrative, with only seven Muslims contributing. The 
tactic of support is evident, but the low proportion of comments by Muslim suggests a 
lack of engagement with racist hashtags, perhaps in an attempt to reduce its further cir-
culation. This is sometimes explicitly stated, as with recurring calls to ‘stop making this 
hashtag trend’. However, it is also possible that the affective response here is that of 
vulnerability in the face of flak from users propagating the original narrative.
It was not universally the case that users refused to engage with attacks on their 
identity and more emotive responses were also present. There was some evidence of 
responses that held similarities to tactics employed by would-be allies, but had a more 
affective dimension due to the way commenters referred to their own identity and 
knowledge. For example, there were 11 responses by Muslims (of 136 comments) to 
Figure 13, a meme circulated by a serial contributor to this hashtag who describes using 
identifiers including ‘Pro-life’, ‘Military’, ‘CCOT’ (Conservative Christians on Twitter), 
and ‘pro guns’. This meme is accompanied by a statement of defiance against ‘the evil’ 
Figure 13. Dominant narrative meme.
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because the countries shown are ‘all united against Islam’. Tactics by participants iden-
tifying as Muslim were to attack the poster for his racism, defend Islam and Muslims 
(disassociating them from terrorism), and dispute aspects of the imagery, such as the use 
of certain flags that suggest the allegiance of specific countries (against Islam). These 
tactics thus resonate with what Abdel-Fadil (2019) describes as ‘affective performances 
. . . attempts at shifting the balance of power, and reclaiming an object, such as an iden-
tity, nation, or religion’.
There was one tweet in this section that did not follow the usual pattern of being 
silenced by persistent flak. This was posted by the founder of the Quilliam Foundation, 
a controversial UK-based counter-extremism organization which has been criticized for 
reinforcing both security policies towards Muslims and the dichotomy between radicals 
and moderates. Not unsurprisingly therefore, this tweet is both critical of the hashtag 
itself and Islam, suggesting that religious reform is also needed. Probably due to the 
diversity of people following the Quilliam foundation (other prominent groups such as 
the Clarion Project3), responses to the tweet are divided and provoke a more nuanced 
intellectual debate around the problem of reform in Islam. There are some repeat right-
wing commenters, but overall this tweet reflects a different audience.
Celebrities and the mainstream media
The support of Muslim participants can also be found in responses to celebrity tweets. As 
discussed in the methodology, we are defining celebrities here as those whose fame orig-
inated in a field other than their use of online media (with our sample including actors, 
comedians and popular musicians). While recognizing that this distinction between 
celebrity types has become blurred, it remained useful here for heuristic purposes as – in 
our sample – microcelebrities tended to derive from the right-wing blogosphere (with 
their tweets conforming to tactics described in the ‘tactics of the right’ section, above). 
The dynamics of celebrity uses of the hashtag, in contrast, was distinctive, demonstrating 
a slightly different trend in the responses compared to other tweets.
Although there were only seven celebrities tweeting the hashtag in the 150 tweets 
analysed, five of these were in the top 50 most shared due to the number of followers 
these accounts had accrued. Most of the celebrities tweeted messages supporting 
Muslims and received mainly positive responses due to the number of fans among their 
followers, including Muslim fans who thanked the celebrity for their support. There 
were some similarities between celebrity engagement with the hashtag and other uses 
(as with many of the regular tweets, the celebrities do not interact with those comment-
ing for instance), but their relationship to the wider counter-narrative was different. As 
discussed above, the most common trend observed beneath wider counter-narrative 
tweets was one of ‘trench warfare’ (Karlsen et al., 2017) where those with opposing 
opinions were brought together, but retrenched existing standpoints rather than engaged 
in dialogue. Celebrity Twitter use, in contrast, was far more akin to an echo-chamber, 
pointing to the limitations of such engagements. One example (Figure 14) is the third 
most shared tweet by a guitarist of a rock band, who describes the hashtag as ‘ridicu-
lous’ and shares the following text:
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This was originally retweeted 3904 times with 6254 likes and 362 comments, most of 
these agreeing with or thanking the celebrity for his support, aimed at trying to capture 
his attention. While there were a few interventions from the right, some of these were 
less hostile (focusing on more general points about political correctness, for example) 
possibly due to their affiliation to the celebrity (24%). Fan accounts of celebrities, on the 
other hand, do follow the normal pattern of a backlash against the counter-narrative they 
tweet, probably due to the wide audience they attract and having less attachment to the 
author.
As with celebrity Twitter accounts, mainstream media organizations also tended to 
foreground the counter-narrative against hate speech, but with a slightly different empha-
sis. When we looked at the hundred most prominent accounts who had shared the hashtag 
(by numbers of followers), we found that almost a quarter of this list consisted of verified 
media institutions (22, including Al Jazeera, CNN, Nigeria Newsdesk, The Independent, 
and The Washington Post). None of these accounts echoed the hashtag’s original mean-
ing in any way (even indirectly), with the majority of accounts instead reporting on the 
counter-narrative and only one (Russia Today) reporting on the existence of the original 
narrative itself. While two institutions in the top 100 that lacked Twitter’s ‘blue tick’ 
(including Breitbart, which was not yet verified) did leverage the hashtag in support of 
anti-Islamic narratives – portraying it as reflecting a broader public mood that was con-
cerned about ‘Islamification’ – again, the majority focused on the counter-narrative. The 
framing of these reports thus suggests it was the counter-narrative’s contestation of hate 
speech, which rendered #stopIslam a newsworthy event.
Figure 14. Meme shared by a celebrity: counter-narrative.
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Unlike other research focused on anti-racist activism (Jackson and Foucault Welles, 
2015, 2016), however, our qualitative findings suggest this uptake of the counter-narra-
tive has significant limitations. On the one hand, these media narratives did not feed back 
into Twitter discourse in a substantive way (with very few of the most retweeted tweets 
coming from verified news institutions). On the other hand, the way the hashtag was 
engaged with by the mainstream media did not fundamentally combat long-standing 
problems of exclusion and discrimination within the press; while contestation of #stopIs-
lam was reported on in a broad sense, this narrative did not offer space for those most 
affected by Islamophobia to have a platform in the mainstream media (in part due to the 
demographic of those participating in the counter-narrative, where Muslim voices were 
outweighed by those of would-be allies). In addition, our qualitative examination of 
comments beneath the most retweeted tweets points to the danger of optimistically 
reporting on the contestation of #stopIslam as reflective of a wider public backlash 
against hate speech or – at least – of the capacity of Twitter to support this backlash. As 
outlined above, the swift way that positive sentiment was shut down by tightly clustered 
networks of users points to the danger of uncritically reporting on the ‘success’ of the 
counter-narrative. Positive framings of responses to the hashtag, moreover, are also in 
danger of distracting from the culpability of certain strands of the mainstream media for 
their own role in creating the conditions in which hate speech can become normalized as 
acceptable public opinion.
Conclusion
Media engagement with counter-narratives against #stopIslam bears out work that has 
discussed the capacity of activist hashtags (Clark-Parsons, 2019) and anti-racist hashtags 
in particular (Jackson and Foucault Welles, 2015, 2016) to afford counter-narratives wider 
news value, here providing an opportunity for alternative constructions of Muslims in the 
public sphere. Yet the media’s engagement with #stopIslam also foregrounds points of 
tension; if mainstream media reports were to be believed, although platforms such as 
Twitter open space for hate speech to circulate, they also offer opportunities for ‘ad hoc 
publics’ (Bruns and Burgess, 2011) to coalesce in order to contest these sentiments. Such 
narratives, however, run the risk of legitimating social media platforms’ own idealistic 
self-presentation of themselves as platforms for freedom of speech that (to draw on the 
language of Twitter’s own terms and conditions) ‘serve the public conversation’ (Twitter, 
2019).
Presenting racism and Islamophobia as something that can be ‘debated’ reinforces 
structural inequalities (Titley, 2019), by appealing to idealized notions of freedom of 
speech that are predicated on the figure of the unmarked, White, Anglo-Saxon man as 
being at the centre of Internet use (Nakamura, 2002). The dangers of valorizing ‘debat-
ability’ are underlined by reflecting on responses beneath the tweets of both Muslims and 
non-Muslims that propagated the original sentiment of #stopIslam. The criticisms of all 
counter-narrative tweets were relatively similar, presented as criticisms of Islam or of 
‘liberalism’ in general, rather than attacking individuals for their religious identity (which 
also had the consequence that these tweets could avoid contravening hate speech guide-
lines). As we have elucidated above, however, the ramifications of these discourses are 
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very different in terms of the emotional labour required from Muslim users and would-be 
allies, respectively.
Depictions of Twitter as contributing to ‘conversation’ are especially dangerous in a 
context animated by affectively charged (Abdel-Fadil, 2019), antagonistic (Evolvi, 
2018) exchanges. In the case of #stopIslam, the reproduction of existing inequalities was 
compounded by the broader media ecology, specifically the relationship between Twitter 
and right-wing media: as evident in the emergence of right-wing bloggers as nodes who 
anchored the tightly bound networks of users circulating hate speech. These dynamics 
meant Twitter debates ultimately consecrated ‘exclusionary solidarities’ (Wahl-
Jorgensen, 2019: 110) via an instrumentalized use of storytelling (Siapera et al., 2015) 
that did not leave space for dialogue but instead closed it down, by propagating a con-
sistent, negative, narrative about Islam. Our findings, therefore, disrupt idealized 
Habermasian scenarios that portray the creation of more space for people to speak as the 
best remedy for hate speech. When reflecting on how to combat hate speech, then, it is 
important to avoid tactics that inadvertently reinforce this notion of ‘debatability’ in the 
framing of counter-narratives, perhaps focusing on identifying Islamophobic and racist 
content as hate speech rather than disputing disinformation in the content of tweets in 
ways that open up avenues for further disinformation to be propagated.
In addition, our findings suggest that even though contesting hate speech can offer 
scope for reframing mainstream media discourse (albeit briefly), caution needs to be 
taken when engaging with narratives where the terms have already been set, pointing to 
the importance of constructing alternative narratives rather than just hijacking existing 
ones. While, following other work in media studies, we have used ‘counter-narratives’ in 
its broadest sense in this article, some academics and campaigners (e.g. Blaya, 2019; De 
Latour et al., 2017) have begun to distinguish between counter-narratives (that offer 
alternative frames) and counter-speech (that attacks or denies the original sentiment of a 
message, but restages it in the process). This narrative/speech distinction is useful in 
making sense of the limitations of some of the tactical attempts to negate Islamophobic 
narratives that we identified, which tended to fall into the counter-speech category thus 
inadvertently recirculated hate speech through the very act of contesting it.
Turning attention to tactics engaged in by those circulating #stopIslam also has 
broader conceptual implications. While #stopIslam illustrates Twitter’s role as an 
‘active agent’ (Kriess and McGregor, 2017) in constituting Islamophobic discourse, it 
is also important to reflect, conversely, on how actors involved in these debates subtly 
modulate the affordances of Twitter. To an extent, De Certeau’s (1984) distinction 
between strategies (the actions of those who define the territory or rules of the game) 
and tactics (the everyday negotiation of these rules by those inhabiting this space) still 
holds. This distinction is particularly useful when it comes to understanding how 
Muslim users and would-be allies tactically negotiated the constraints established by 
both Twitter and the original narrative. Other tactics, however, depart from work in 
media theory that has employed the tactics/strategies distinction; they are not the ‘arts 
of the weak’ that assume a marginal position and can be co-opted by the strategic 
activities of social media companies (Manovich, 2009). Instead particular tactics are 
increasingly intervening in the affordances of social media platforms in ways that suit 
the needs of the actors that deploy them.
1438 new media & society 23(6)
The significance of right-wing tactics is particularly evident in the way that social 
media platforms have attempted to combat hate speech and disinformation. While 
Twitter’s monetization of debate means it benefits from controversy to an extent, in 
order to preserve this flow of capital and avoid censure, content at the heart of these 
controversies then has to be deleted. These economic relations, combined with the 
activities of right-wing actors described here, are what have driven strategic changes to 
hate speech guidelines, led to the deletion of content and resulted in a push for ‘techno-
fixes’ (Marres, 2018) to combat disinformation (such as Twitter’s own call for develop-
ers to work with them and find algorithmic solutions to monitor the ‘healthiness’ of 
communication on the network; Twitter, 2018). These strategies, however, ultimately 
leave those most affected by hate speech vulnerable to attack by creating ‘operational 
distinctions between organised, extreme racism and ambient, banal everyday race talk’ 
(Siapera, 2019: 2) that can be exploited by right-wing groups to circumvent social 
media terms and conditions in order to normalize xenophobia (Feshami, 2018). More, 
these strategies consecrate the position of mainstream media as a ‘legitimate’ news 
sources in ways that mask their role in normalizing xenophobia.
The stakes of these developments are high; although the tactical work of a range of 
different activist groups (including leftist, anti-capitalist, and environmental movements) 
has been shown to subtly re-shape the affordances of particular media platforms 
(Feigenbaum, 2014; Poole et al., 2019; Treré, 2019), this study suggests that the dynam-
ics of social media afford more agency to well-organized groups with stronger ties (here 
the right). In addition, the tactical form of action taken by the right, combined with the 
rhetorical framing of the content of these interventions, makes these groups appear mar-
ginal – fighting against media censorship and the liberal left – at the same time, as these 
actions are subtly modulating the affordances of social media to consecrate hegemonic 
values and exclude divergent voices. What is particularly concerning about #stopIslam, 
therefore, is that it illustrates how the strategies of social media platforms can create 
conditions that lend themselves not just to the actions, but ideological commitments of 
right-wing populist groups.
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Notes
1. Gnip is a commercial company specializing in the aggregation of social media content.
2. The intention was to collect data for a month but the funding allowed for some extra time. 
Following a small pilot study, that showed how counter-narratives dropped off over time, we 
considered it worthwhile to do this.
3. Its website describes itself as ‘A non-profit educational organization providing a platform for 
human rights activists and for challenging Islamic extremism’; https://clarionproject.org. It is 
based in the United States.
References
Abdel-Fadil M (2019) The politics of affect: the glue of religious and identity conflicts in social 
media. Journal of Religion, Media and Digital Culture 8(1): 11–34.
Awan I (2014) Islamophobia on Twitter: a typology of online hate against Muslims on social 
media. Policy & Internet 6: 133–150.
Baker P, Gabrielatos C and McEnery T (2013) Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The 
Representation of Islam in the British Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Blaya C (2019) Cyberhate: a review and content analysis of intervention strategies. Aggression 
and Violent Behavior 45: 163–172.
boyd d and Crawford K (2012) Critical questions for big data. Information, Communication & 
Society 15(5): 662–679.
Broersma M and Graham T (2013) Twitter as a news source: how Dutch and British newspapers 
used tweets in their news coverage, 2007–2011. Journalism Practice 7(4): 446–464.
Bruns A and Burgess J (2011) The use of Twitter hashtags in the formation of Ad hoc publics. 
In: Proceedings of the 6th European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) general 
conference 2011, University of Iceland, Reykjavik. Available at: https://eprints.qut.edu.
au/46515/
Clark-Parsons R (2019) ‘I see you, I believe you, I stand with you’: #MeToo and the perfor-
mance of networked feminist visibility. Feminist Media Studies, 1–19. DOI: 10.1080/ 
14680777.2019.1628797.
Copsey N, Dack J, Littler M, et al. (2013) Anti-Muslim Hate Crime and the Far Right. 
Middlesbrough: Teeside University.
Cresswell J and Clark V (2007) Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. London: 
SAGE.
D’Ancona M (2017) Post-Truth. London: Random House.
Dawes S (2017) #JeSuisCharlie, #JeNeSuisPasCharlie and ad hoc publics. In Titley G, Freedman 
D, Khiabany G, et al. (eds) After Charlie Hebdo. London: Zed Books, pp. 180–191.
De Certeau M (1984) The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press.
De Latour A, Perger N, Salag R, et al. (2017) We Can!: Taking Action Against Hate Speech 
through Counter and Alternative Narratives. Revised ed. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
De Ridder S (2013) Are digital media institutions shaping youth’s intimate stories? New Media & 
Society 17(3): 356–374.
Deacon D, Murdock G, Pickering M, et al. (2007) Researching Communications: A Practical 
Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis. London: Bloomsbury.
Dean J (2009) Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies. Durham, NC; New York: Duke 
University Press.
Emcke C (2019) Against Hate. Cambridge: Polity Press.
1440 new media & society 23(6)
Evolvi G (2018) #Islamexit: inter-group antagonism on Twitter. Information, Communication & 
Society 22(3): 386–401.
Farkas J, Schou J and Neumayer C (2017) Cloaked Facebook pages: exploring fake Islamist propa-
ganda in social media. New Media & Society 20(5): 1850–1867.
Feigenbaum A (2014) Resistant matters: tents, tear gas and the ‘other media’ of occupy. 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 11(1): 15–24.
Fenton N (2010) New Media, Old News: Journalism and Democracy in the Digital Age. London: 
SAGE.
Feshami KA (2018) Voices of white resistance: democratic theory and the task of contending with 
white nationalist voice. Open Library of Humanities 4(2): 391–326.
Frenda S (2018) The role of sarcasm in hate speech. A multilingual perspective. Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/39364015/The_role_of_sarcasm_in_hate_speech._A_multilin-
gual_perspective
Giraud E (2018) Displacement, ‘failure’ and friction: tactical interventions in the communication 
ecologies of anti-capitalist food activism. In: Schneider T, Karin E, Catherine D, et al. (eds) 
Digital Food Activism. New York; London: Routledge, pp. 48–68.
Giraud E (2019) What Comes after Entanglement? Activism, Anthropocentrism and an Ethics of 
Exclusion. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Herman E and Chomsky N (1988) Manufacturing Consent. London: Random House.
Holohan S (2019) Some human’s rights: neocolonial discourses of otherness in the Mediterranean 
refugee crisis. Open Library of Humanities 5(1): 1–27.
Horsti K (2017) Digital Islamophobia: the Swedish woman as a figure of pure and dangerous 
whiteness. New Media & Society 19(9): 1440–1457.
Jackson SJ and Foucault Welles B (2015) Hijacking #myNYPD: social media dissent and net-
worked counterpublics. Journal of Communication 65(6): 932–952.
Jackson SJ and Foucault Welles B (2016) # Ferguson is everywhere: initiators in emerging coun-
terpublic networks. Information, Communication & Society 19(3): 397–418.
Karlsen R, Steen-Johnsen K, Wollebæk D, et al. (2017) Echo chamber and trench warfare dynam-
ics in online debates. European Journal of Communication 32(3): 257–273.
Kellner D (2016) American Nightmare. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Kriess D and McGregor S (2017) Technology firms shape political communication: the work of 
Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and Google with campaigns during the 2016 U.S. presidential 
cycle. Political Communication 35(2): 155–177.
Lezaun (2018) The public’s two bodies: food activism in digital media. In: Schneider T, Eli K, 
Dolan C, et al. (eds) Digital Food Activism. London: Routledge, pp. 220–227.
Liao T and Humphreys L (2014) Layar-ed places: using mobile augmented reality to tacti-
cally reengage, reproduce, and reappropriate public space. New Media & Society 17(9): 
1418–1435.
Manovich L (2009) The practice of everyday (media) life: from mass consumption to mass cultural 
production? Critical Inquiry 35(2): 319–331.
Marantz A (2018) Inside the daily Stormer’s style guide. The New Yorker, 8 January. Available 
at: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/inside-the-daily-stormers-style-guide
Marres N (2018) Why we can’t have our facts back. Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 
4: 423–443.
Martin J (2016) The rhetoric of excess. In: Jackson D, Thorsen E and Wring D (eds) EU 
Referendum Analysis 2016: Media, Voters and the Campaign: Early Reflections from Leading 
UK Academics. Poole: The Centre for the Study of Journalism, Culture and Community, 
Bournemouth University, p. 21.
Poole et al. 1441
Maxfield M (2015) History retweeting itself: imperial feminist appropriations of ‘Bring Back Our 
Girls’. Feminist Media Studies 16(5): 886–900.
Mendes K, Ringrose J and Keller J (2018) #MeToo and the promise and pitfalls of challenging 
rape culture through digital feminist activism. European Journal of Women’s Studies 25(2): 
236–246.
Mercea D, Ianelli L and Loader BD (2016) Protest communication ecologies. Information, 
Communication & Society 19(3): 279–289.
Modood T (2017) Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in 
comparative perspective. Ethnic and Racial Studies 40: 1191–1226.
Nakamura L (2002) Cybertypes: Race, Ethnicity and Identity on the Internet. New York: 
Routledge.
Ott BL (2017) The age of Twitter: Donald J. Trump and the politics of debasement. Critical Studies 
in Media Communication 34(1): 59–68.
Ouellette L and Banet-Weiser S (2018) Media and the extreme right: editor’s introduction. 
Communication, Culture & Critique 11(1): 1–6.
Poole E (2002) Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims. London: I.B. Tauris.
Poole E, Giraud E and de Quincey E (2019) Contesting #stopIslam: the dynamics of a counter-
narrative against hate speech. Open Library of Humanities 5(1): 1–39.
Rambukanna N (2015) From #RaceFail to #Ferguson: the digital intimacies of race-activist hashtag 
publics. The Fibreculture Journal 26. Available at: http://twentysix.fibreculturejournal.org/
fcj-194-from-racefail-to-ferguson-the-digital-intimacies-of-race-activist-hashtag-publics/
Ringrose J (2018) Digital feminist pedagogy and post-truth misogyny. Teaching in Higher 
Education 23(5): 647–656.
Schradie J (2019) The Revolution That Wasn’t: How Digital Activism Favors Conservatives. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sharma S (2013) Black Twitter? Racial hashtags, networks and contagion. New Formations 78: 
46–64.
Siapera E (2019) Organised and ambient digital racism: multidirectional flows in the Irish digital 
sphere. Open Library of Humanities 5(1): 13.
Siapera E, Boudouris M, Lenis S, et al. (2018) Refugees and network publics on Twitter: net-
worked framing, affect, and capture. Social Media and Society 4(1): 2056305118764437. 
DOI: 10.1177/2056305118764437.
Siapera E, Hunt G and Lynn T (2015) #GazaUnderAttack: Twitter, Palestine and diffused war. 
Information, Communication & Society 18(11): 1217–1319.
Titley G (2019) Racism and the Media. London: SAGE.
Torchin L (2016) Kony 2012 – anatomy of a campaign video and a video campaign. In: Tzioumakis 
Y and Molloy C (eds) The Routledge Companion to Cinema and Politics. London; New 
York: Roudledge, pp. 123–134.
Townsend L and Wallace C (2016) Social Media Research: A Guide to Ethics. Aberdeen: 
University of Aberdeen. Available at: www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_487729_en.pdf (accessed 
23 July 2019).
Treré E (2019) Hybrid Media Activism: Ecologies, Imaginaries, Algorithms. London; New York: 
Routledge.
Twitter (2018) Twitter health metrics proposal submission. Available at: https://blog.twitter.com/
official/en_us/topics/company/2018/twitter-health-metrics-proposal-submission.html
Twitter (2019) The Twitter rules. Available at: https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/
twitter-rules
Wahl-Jorgensen K (2019) Emotions, Media and Politics. London: Polity Press.
1442 new media & society 23(6)
Author biographies
Elizabeth Poole is professor of Media and Communications at Keele University. Her work has 
focused on analysing the representational frameworks that dominate in news about Muslims; 
how these are constructed through political and organisational contexts, and are normalised 
amongst audiences.
Eva Haifa Giraud is a senior lecturer in Media at Keele University, whose research focuses on 
frictions and affinities between non-anthropocentric theories and activist practice. Her mono-
graph on these themes, What Comes After Entanglement? (Duke University Press), was pub-
lished in 2019.
Ed de Quincey is a senior lecturer in Computer Science at Keele University. He has researched and 
taught in the area of online behaviour for 17 years, looking into the usability and impact of web-
sites as well as the uses of the information they collect. He has previously collected and analysed 
data from social media platforms to investigate disease outbreaks and other health related issues 
such as hay fever and psychosis.
